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Since the end of the nineteenth century, and especially since world war II, most industrialized countries have established a public pension system following the pay-as-you-go method, where contributions of the active are immediately given as transfers to the retired. It is well-known that the rentability of this system is equal to the growth rate of the economy (Aaron 1966) , while the return on contributions to a funded system clearly equals the interest rate, that is, in a competitive capital market, the marginal productivity of capital. As both the growth rate of population and that of labor productivity, which determine the growth rate of the economy, have declined in the last decades, the question arises whether a transition from the established unfunded to a funded system can be performed. The problem is that in the phase of transition the active would have to bear a two-fold burden: paying for the pensions of the retired and accumulating a sufficient stock of capital, from which their own pensions could be financed. Hence, the usual opinion says that such a transition would make at least one generation worse off than it would be with the given system. However, in recent studies some authors have argued that a Pareto-improving transition from an unfunded to a funded system is in fact possible (Homburg 1990 , Homburg and Richter 1990 , Breyer and Straub 1993 . Their argument rests on the observation that contributions to the unfunded system are usually levied in the form of a tax on~labor income and distort, thus, the labor-leisure decision of the individuals, causing a deadweight-loss. A change of the system would mean that this deadweight-loss is removed, and the corresponding surplus could be used to design a Pareto-improving transition.
More precisely, the idea of these authors is to substitute, in the phase of transition, the income tax by a lump-sum tax, which could then gradually be reduced to zero, because of -2 -the gains in efficiency. The intention of the present study is to show that this argument is based on an incomplete consideration of the reason why contributions are imposed as a tax on labor income in the existing system. As is obvious from taxation theory, the introduction of an income tax instead of a lump-sum tax only makes sense if the economy consists of different individuals, who should be treated in a different way, but who cannot be identified by their primary characteristic (say, ability). Income is then used as a surrogate variable for distinguishing between individuals.
In view of this, an appropriate analysis requires the formulation of an overlappinggenerations model with differing individuals. In such a model, two motives for a differentiated treatment of individuals in the public pension system can be investigated:
(i) intragenerational redistribution or (ii) intragenerational fairness. I have shown in another paper (Brunner 1993 ) that if a pay-as-you-go pension system performs intragenerational redistribution (in the form that contributions are proportional to income but benefits are uniform), then, in general, no Pareto-improving transition to a funded system exists. In this study I argue that the same is true if the unfunded pension system follows intragenerational fairness, i.e., if contributions as well as pensions of an individual are proportional to his income in the active period. Such a system was studied in Breyer and Straub (1993) ; their positive result on the existence of a Pareto-improving transition is based on a comparison of the conditions for a first-best system with the properties of a distorted system, without any account of institutional restrictions (as they acknowledge themselves, p. 89). If the question, which instruments are available for a transition, is considered explicitly, the positive result turns out to be valid only under rather restrictive assumptions, such as nearly identical individuals.
The condition for a Pareto-improving transition requires that no individual of any generation may be made worse off, which obviously represents a more severe restriction in -3 -the case of differing individuals. The essential point of this study is to show that any change of the system, intended to reduce the deadweight-loss, normally involves intragenerational redistribution and conflicts, therefore, with the Pareto criterion. The main argument goes as follows: If the growth rate of the economy is lower than the interest rate, any contribution to the unfunded pension system reduces life-time income. Clearly, the loss is the higher, the higher the contribution. Thus, given that individuals have different incomes, even an intragenerationally fair system (with contributions and benefits proportional to income) imposes differing losses of life-time income on them (as does, obviously, a redistributive system). As a consequence, if this system is replaced by one with lump-sum contributions (and benefits), the condition for a Pareto-improvement requires that no individual has to pay "considerably" more than before. That is, in a Pareto-improving first-best system, lump-sum contributions would have to be in some way differentiated between individuals (as in the proportional system).. However, as was mentioned above, this instrument is not available, because the government cannot be assumed to have precise knowledge necessary to identify individuals by their primary characteristic.
As an alternative method (instead of using lump-sum taxation) of initiating a transition to a funded system, one could think of replacing the proportionality rule by a more sophisticated method of determining income-related contributions and benefits. Such a change might also reduce the excess burden caused by the unfunded system, and this~ gain might allow a Pareto-improving transition. In this study we consider an affine (or "linear") relation between contributions and gross income. But again, the introduction of such a rule would, in general, represent an act of redistribution, making at least one individual worse off. Altogether, we find that, except in special cases, no implementable instrument exists which could be used for a Pareto-improving transition from an unfunded to a funded pension system.
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In Section II an overlapping-generations model with differing individuals will be formulated, which represents the framework for the detailed presentation of the argument.
Section III contains the main analysis of instruments for a transition, where III.l deals with lump-sum taxation and III.2 with linear income taxation; III.3 contains remarks on debt-financed transition. In Section IV the results are summarized and some concluding comments are added.
II The model
As was mentioned in the introduction, a necessary prerequisite for an adequate formulation of the> problem is to consider a model with different individuals. For simplicity we assume that only two types of individuals exist (the conclusion would be the same with more types), who are characterized by their abilities a < a . As is usual in the simple overlapping-generations model, every individual lives for two periods, he is active in the first and retired in the second. The ability parameter influences the wage rate w! = a V of the individuals, where w denotes the wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, t is a period index. The preferences of a type-i individual are described by a strictly quasi-concave utility function u*(c\z* ,1*), where c* z 1 are consumption in the active and retirement period, resp., and l! denotes labor supply, u 1 is taken as twice differentiable with partial
The groups are assumed to be of equal size, denoted by N , with exogenously given growth factor G , i.e., N = N G . For simplicity, we assume that the abilities a 1 remain constant over time.
In this paper we consider an unfunded pension system where contributions depend on gross income with a constant contribution rate b, and pension payments pj to the retired are (2) and (3) In this framework, a fully-funded system is characterized by b = 0, which means that it is equivalent to private saving for old-age consumption; the relevant issue is that its rentability is determined by the interest factor R . The rentability of the contributions t"t*l to the unfunded system is p| /(bw)lj) = G Q . Hence we have the familiar condition -6 -G. ,.n < R, ,,, which determines whether the unfunded (>) or the funded (<) system is preferable from the point of view of individual rentability. In the latter case, D = 1 -t*Ti / G Q /R . is positive, and, as (5) shows, bw'l'D describes the loss in life-time income caused by the contribution bw'l' to the unfunded system.
Taking w* = a'w and R as given, and forming expectations concerning G , 1) , w'
Total goods supply in period t is K. + F(K,,L,) 1 , which can be used for consumption and
saving. The stock of capital is equal to savings one period ago, that is (Kj denotes capital possessed by group i)
Competitive factor markets will ensure that
Additionally, we have (13) wj = aV, i = 1,2.
We generally assume that individuals have perfect foresight concerning future labor supply as well as growth of population and wages, thus they know G , fi . Then, in period t = t , where capital equipments K* = S! , i = 1,2 and, hence, K are given, equilibrium (2), (5) - (13), where it should be noted that all but (8), (10), (11), (12) hold for i = 1,2.
!F(K ,L ) is production net of depreciation.
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m Transition
The question, we want to answer in this study, is whether a change of the pension system is possible without making any individual worse off than with the former system. Of course, this question is relevant only if the rentability of the unfunded system is lower than that of the funded system. Thus, we assume in the following generally, for any pension system we consider, that the growth rate of the economy is lower than the interest rate, formally
Let an unfunded pension system with contribution rate B be given in period t. and let for shortness of notation we neglect this dependency in the following and take initial values as fixed.)
As is well-known, an existing unfunded pension system cannot simply be abolished, because this would mean that in some period the retired get no benefits, though they paid contributions when they were active. Thus, if the system is to be substituted by a funded one, contributions of the active, given as transfers to the retired, are still needed during some phase of transition. This in turn means that the only way to initiate a change of the system is to begin with an alternative method of raising the revenue from the active. We analyze in this section whether such an alternative method of raising contributions exists, where no individual is made worse off. If the answer is negative, we can conclude that no transition to an unfunded pension system can be performed. Using (19) and (20) instead of (5) and (7), the dynamics of the economy, when the unfunded pensions are financed by lump-sum contributions, can be described analogous to that at the end of Section II. We denote by \{ft.) indirect utility of a type-i individual in this process.
Of course, the way contributions have to be paid by the individuals influences their labor supply and savings, thus the growth rate of total income and the interest rate. However, one can expect that both the growth rate and the interest rate do not change too much, if -1 1 -proportional contributions are substituted by lump-sum ones, when total revenue is fixed.
We formulate this as an explicit assumption: 
III.1.2 The impossibility of transition
Now suppose that in some period t the government, initiating a transition from the unfunded to a funded system, substitutes the proportional (to gross income) contributions by lump-sum ones. In order that the retired generation does not lose in this process7the It should be noted that this condition does not refer to a comparison between a funded and an unfunded system, but only to the method by which a fixed revenue for the unfunded system is raised. The reason for the introduction of GRL is to avoid complications, which are inessential for the main message, when we prove the result of this section.
-1 2 -Obviously, the first-best choice would be to set ft = Bw*l*(B), which would mean that t t t lump-sum contributions differentiated according to the type of individual are imposed.
However, to implement this instrument, government needs appropriate information (in our model: knowledge of the individual abilities) which, as was mentioned in the introduction, it usually does not possess. We formulate this assumption explicitly:
IN: The authority knows that two types of individuals exist, and knows the utility function u 1 and ability a 1 of each type, but cannot identify individuals.
As a consequence of IN, the government can impose lump-sum taxes only in an arbitrary way (that is, such that they are not associated to a specific type of individual). We ask whether it can happen that an individual is made worse off by a change to this method of raising contributions. Proof: Suppose, government wants to change the existing unfunded system in some period t by the introduction of a lump-sum tax. As it cannot identify the individuals, a possibility is Essentially, however, this procedure is valid only if identical individuals are assumed, as Breyer and Straub (1993, p.80) do. In the more realistic case of differing individuals, Result 1 shows that the institutional and informational framework, in which a change should take place, must not be neglected. Indeed, its consideration reveals the real problem.
III.2 Transition by means of income-depending contributions
Having dealt with the problematic character of a transition by use of lump-sum taxes, we turn now to a discussion of the possibilities opened up by income-depending contributions.
We assume again that an intragenerationally fair unfunded pension system, with contributions and benefits being proportional to income, is given, and that a change to a funded system is intended. The idea is that a better second-best instrument than the proportionality rule, i.e., a less distorting income-related tax could be used to produce a surplus through a reduction of the excess burden, and to finance a Pareto-improving transition by this surplus. Of course, the excess burden can never be removed completely with an income-depending tax, but it may be reduced, and this may create a sufficiently large surplus for our purpose.
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III.2.1 A linear contribution rule
It is immediately clear that the system would have to be more complicated than that of proportional contributions, because in general no other rate than B would raise just the revenue required from the active generation for the benefits of the retired. As the most general approach we could think of a function r: R -» R, where r (yj) is the required t t t contribution of an individual having gross income y! = wjl!. However, we do not consider t t t the general case but limit our analysis to a specific, simple type of function, namely when
T is an affine function, r (y) = a + by. This type is widely used in taxation theory,
frequently under the heading of "linear" taxation.
In order that in period t a change of the pension system can start, contributions are fulfilled. For comparability of the systems, we assume again that the return on contributions is G Q , which also reflects intragenerational fairness. Moreover, it is t"rl t^l clear that the same limits for the individual contributions as in case of lump-sum taxation (see III.l) must hold, that is, a + by* < /^' max must be fulfilled. Otherwise an individual would certainly be made worse off.
As in III.l, we want to avoid unessential complications and assume that the influence of the contribution rule on the growth rate of total income and the interest rate can be neglected.
GRI: Let R. , .(b^a.) and ft, Ab.,a.) be the interest factor and the growth factor of total income, given that contributions are imposed according to the function c* t + b t , where 2<* t + b t (yj(b t ,a t ) + yj(b t ,a t )) = B(yJ(B) + yj (6) AM. a (x t ,y t ) > a (x t ,y t ), for any x t and y t> This condition, which is usual in optimum income taxation theory, requires that, for any bundle (x ,y ), the marginal rate of substitution between gross income and composite 
t t t t t t bL
labor supply of the more able individual is at least as large to earn more gross (and net) income than the less able, irrespective of the tax function. (In fact, this also holds for any nonlinear tax r (y). For a discussion see Brunner 1989, p.26) . In other words, the ordering of abilities extends to that of the individuals' incomes.
With these preparations we can analyze the effect of a marginal change from (B,0) to some (b.,a,). Clearly, the marginal contribution rate can either be increased or decreased. We B(y^B) + y t (B)), the more qualified are made worse off.
-18-Proof: Assume, as a first step, that the increase of B is accompanied by the introduction of some appropriate a in such a way that utility of the more qualified individuals remains constant. We ask whether this leads to a reduction of total tax revenue. If so, then in a second step additional revenue must be raised by an increase of a , which means that welfare of the type-2 individuals is decreased.
The proof is given diagrammatically, by use of figure 1 , where the horizontal axis describes gross income, while the vertical axis describes expenditures on the composite commodity. tangent to the indifference curves 1 , 1 , resp., describe the decisions of the two individuals. -19-the 45°-line and B(b t ,a t ) and, thus, the contribution C 1 F 1 is lower than A 1 H 1 .
Hence, if utility of the more qualified is held constant, an increase of the marginal contribution rate violates the budget constraint of the pension sysem. Therefore, a must t be increased, which means that at least the more qualified are made worse off than with B.
QED.
Usually, an increase of the marginal contribution rate (with the adaptation of a such that revenue remains constant) represents an instrument of redistribution from the top to the bottom: A higher marginal rate hits the type-2 individuals (who earn more income, due to AM) more than the others, while the associated reduction of a (financed by the increase of the marginal rate) is the same for both types. Due to the increase of the excess burden, this reduction of a cannot compensate both, but only the type-1 individuals; they usually win b in this procedure. However, it may happen that even these cannot be compensated, because the additional revenue, raised by the increase of B, is too small, then both types lose.
Of course, if we turn to the effect of lowering B, we simply find the opposite of that of an increase: Usually a decrease of the marginal contribution rate (with the adaptation of a b such that revenue remains constant) means redistribution from the bottom to the top, by the reversed procedure as described above. But now, corresponding to the case that all lose by an increase, it can happen that all win by a decrease of the marginal contribution-rate, because the excess burden is now reduced. This corresponds to a well-known result in taxation theory that the deadweigtht loss is of second order with respect to the tax rate (see, e.g., Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p.368) ), while the revenue effect is of first order. For the same reason, the marginal tax rate of the optimal linear income tax is positive, if some redistribution is desired (Hellwig 1986 , Brunner 1989 ). Altogether, we can summarize our findings as follows:
Result 2: Assume AM and GRI and let an unfunded pension system with contribution rate B be given. If leisure is a normal good and B is not too large, no Pareto-improving transition to a funded system by means of a linear contribution rule is possible.
Proof: Follows from the Lemmas 2 and 3. QED.
HI .3 Debt-financed transition
For the sake of completeness the possibility of using public debt as an instrument for a transition from the unfunded to a funded pension system must be taken into accounjL_This For an open economy it was shown in Brunner (1993) that debt financing does not provide -2 2 -active population, they now offer a credit instead of their former contribution. The difference is that the credit is given voluntarily, because its return is R , which is larger than G .ft ,, by assumption (16).
t " X l t"T~l
One detects immediately that this procedure cannot work, because to repay the credit plus interest, the government would have to collect -as a credit or as obligatory contributionsa higher amount than with the former system from the active generation in the next period. If it uses a credit again, it ends up with a Ponzi scheme, where public debt grows permanently faster than the economy, which must lead to a collapse. Otherwise we are back to the former system, but with higher contributions. It follows from these short considerations that public debt represents no method, which could make a transition to a funded system possible.
IV Concluding remarks
The intention of this paper was to model an intragenerationally fair pay-as-you-go pension system, when individuals differ in earning ability, and to investigate the possibility of a Pareto-improving transition to a fully-funded system. In this framework, the Pareto criterion requires that no individual of any generation is made worse off, which turns out to be a severe restriction on the construction of measures for a transition. -With a fair rule, contributions and benefits are proportional to gross income, with a fixed contribution rate b. At the same time, the choice of b determines the loss in life-time a method for a Pareto-improving transition from an intragenerationally redistributive unfunded pension system to a funded one. It is not difficult to see that the same is true, if the existing unfunded system is intragenerationally fair.
-2 3 -income, by*D , for any individual, caused by the existence of an obligatory unfunded pension system. Any attempt to alter the system must start with a change of the contribution rule, without reducing total revenue. Only ability-specific lump-sum contributions would represent an improvement for all, but these must be excluded, due to a lack of information on the side of the authority. As was shown in Section III, if individuals are sufficiently different, the use of arbitrary lump-sum contributions or of a linear rule in general represents an act of redistribution within a generation and makes therefore at least one individual worse off.
Probably, in the model of this paper, a more complicated rule than the linear would allow a Pareto improvement. However, one has to observe that in reality there exist many different types of individuals, and that such a rule would presumably be characterized by a number of parameters which is larger than that of types. Therefore, the implementation of such a measure seems hardly realistic.
A problematic aspect of our analysis may lie in the fact that throughout the paper we concentrated on the immediate effect of the contribution rule on the distortion of the labor-leisure decisions of the individuals, but spent little attention to changes in capital formation. (Remember the assumptions GRL and GRI.) This is justified, firstly, by the fact that Breyer and Straub (1993) considered the same problem, and our intention was to analyze their result in a more detailed model. But also, it seems to be a rather-plausible assumption that a change of the contribution rule, with constant tax revenue, does not per se influence capital formation and future labor supply to such an extent that the distributive effects, analyzed in section III, are outweighed. Still, this question would be interesting to be settled by further research.
